In this paper, we examine how the business and interest rate cycles in developed countries affects FDI to developing countries. After aggregating flows into three big source areas (the U.S., Europe and Japan), we find FDI flows to be countercyclical with respect to both output and interest rate cycles in the first two, whereas in Japan they display either no cyclical behavior or a mild procyclical one. This finding is consistent with the fact that FDI outflows and local investment tend to move in opposite directions during the cycles in the first two sources, reflecting investors' arbitrage among different investment opportunities. In sum, and contrary to what is usually claimed, we conclude that recessions in industrial countries are likely to increase FDI flows, particularly to those countries with close ties with the U.S. and Europe.
Introduction
Over the last 15 years, flows of foreign direct investment around the world have been growing spectacularly. While international trade has doubled, flows of foreign direct investments (FDI) have increased by a factor of 10. The evolution of FDI flows to developing countries also contrasts with that of portfolio flows. While the latter grew very rapidly at the beginning of the decade, they dropped substantially in the second half of the 1990s. At the same time FDI kept growing and in 1999 accounted for more than 80 percent of private capital flows to developing countries (their share dropped to 70 percent in 2000, see Figure 1 ). In the case of Latin America, the surge in FDI was even more spectacular. Starting 1993, the rate of growth of FDI has been around 30% per year. At the same time, other private flows grew very rapidly at the beginning of the decade, but took a dive in 1995, following the Mexican crisis. As a consequence, while in 1993 and 1994 portfolio capital represented almost all the net private capital flowing into Latin America, since 1999 nearly 100% of the net private capital flows into the region were FDI. Thus, when it comes to private external financing for Latin American countries, FDI has virtually become the "only game in town".
As a result, a "sudden stop" of FDI could have consequences for the sustainability of the region's finances that are comparable to those experienced after portfolio flows reversals, particularly at a time when the trade balance of heavily indebted Latin American economies are being negatively affected by the slowdown in industrial countries. In this context, the cyclical behavior of FDI flows becomes an issue of not only academic but also practical relevance.
To what extent should we be concerned about the impact of recessions in the developed world on emerging economies' access to international capital? Does the interest rate cycle typically associated to the countercyclical monetary policy in industrial countries play a role similar to that documented for the case of portfolio capital (Calvo et al., 1993) ? While there is a growing literature that studies the host country determinants of FDI inflows (e.g., Lim, 2001 , Stein and Daude, 2001 , Levy Yeyati et al., 2002 , empirical work on source country determinants on FDI outflows is much more limited. Previous attempts to study the relationship between FDI and the source country's economic cycle have focused on aggregate data on FDI flows and used the US cycle as a proxy for source country cycle (see for example Calvo et al., 2001) . 1 Yet, the US represents no more than 30% of total outflows of FDI from OECD countries and a similar fraction of total inflows into non-OECD countries.
In this paper, we extend previous empirical work on the cyclical nature of FDI by using a dataset on bilateral FDI flows from OECD countries based on the OECD's International Direct Investment Statistics. The dataset covers flows from 22 source countries to 56 (developed and developing) host countries, starting in 1980. This database allows us to estimate the cyclical effects in a much more precise manner, capturing both source and host characteristics, and unveiling patterns that were hidden in aggregate FDI data.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows: (i) FDI flows tend to move coutercyclically with respect to the business cycle of the source country; (ii) the interest rate cycle of the source country is an important determinant of FDI flows; 2 and (iii) FDI and local investment are negatively correlated indicating that these two forms of investment are substitutes.
Once we disaggregate according to three big FDI source areas (the US, Europe, and Japan), we find that FDI from Japan exhibits a procyclical behavior. In all cases, FDI appears to be more sensitive to the evolution of interest rates than it is to output fluctuations, which appears to suggest that FDI is in this regard no different from the more volatile portfolio flows. However, we do not find a significantly positive correlation between portfolio and direct investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the main arguments underpinning the link between business cycles in the source country and the behavior of outward FDI flows. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical methodology used in the tests. Section 4 reports the main empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
Why should the cycle affect FDI?
There are different channels through which the business cycle could affect FDI outflows. On the one hand, during expansions (i.e., when the cyclical component of output is positive and large) firms typically have higher earnings to invest both at home and abroad. Through this income effect, we should expect FDI outflows to increase during the positive part of the cycle, in line with the increase in domestic investment. Thus, according to this argument, FDI should display the same procyclical behavior extensively documented for domestic investment.
However, firms are expected to allocate their investment according to the relative rates of return at home and abroad. To the extent that the marginal productivity of capital tends to behave procyclically, expansions should induce a substitution effect that reduces FDI, as foreign investment prospects become relatively less attractive. This substitution, a simple consequence of the investors' arbitrage between different investment options, is no different from the interest rate effect reported in Calvo et al. (1993) for the case of portfolio capital in Latin America.
In addition, the behavior of FDI flows has to take into account the evolution of financing costs at home and abroad. Since a large fraction of the foreign operations of FDI is financed in the source's financial market, the source-host interest rate differential should have a positive influence on FDI outflows, particularly when the destination is a developing economy with limited access to international capital. In turn, inasmuch as monetary authorities in the source country can run a countercyclical monetary, total investment and, in particular, FDI should reflect the cyclical evolution of funding costs at home.
Data and Empirical Methodology
Our data comprises gross bilateral FDI flows originated in OECD countries, compiled in the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics 3 The panel reports annual data from 1980 to 1999 covering 22 source countries and 56 host countries, and yielding a total of 1,232 country pairs and 22,213 observations. As our focus is on the impact of business cycles at the source on flows to developing economies, we restrict our attention to pairs for which the source is an industrial economy and the recipient is a non-industrial one. 4 For simplicity, we refer to these observations (which can be interpreted as flows between high-income countries and the rest of the world), as north-south FDI flows.
5 Of these, and for reason that will be become clear later on, we restrict attention to flows originated in the US, Japan and European OECD countries. 6 Finally, approximately 25 percent of our country pairs report no FDI flows during the whole sample period. This absence of flows may be due to factors that cannot be captured by our regression (e.g., trade embargoes, closed capital accounts or other institutional factors), potentially biasing our results. To address this concern, in what follows we drop these observations, reducing our final sample to 19 source countries, 451 North-South pairs and 7691 observations. Table  1 presents the summary statistics.
Our empirical strategy is loosely based on the gravity model that is a standard specification in the empirical literature on the determinants of bilateral trade, and has also been recently used in the analysis of FDI location. 7 In its simplest formulation, it states that bilateral trade flows (in our case bilateral FDI flows) depend on the product of the GDPs of both economies and the distance between them, in analogy to Newton's gravitational attraction between two bodies. Typical variables added to the simplest gravity specification in the trade literature include GDP per capita or population, as well as dummies indicating whether the two countries share a common border, a common language, past colonial links, common currency, etc.
Given that our main interest in this paper lies in the cyclical nature of FDI, we use a modified version of the standard gravity model, using a log-linear trend GDP instead of using the source country's GDP. This specification is motivated by the particular question we want to answer, namely whether expansions in the source (periods in which output exceeds its long run level) are associated with larger than average FDI flows to developing countries.
In addition, we replace time-invariant, pair-specific variables (such as bilateral distance or common language) by country-pair fixed effects, in order to isolate the dynamic effects leaving out the cross-sectional variation. Formally, we adopt the following specification: As noted, business (and interest rate) cycles in the source can affect FDI through both an income and a substitution effect. While the income effect can be linked more naturally to the concept of "output gap" (that is, the difference between the actual income and trend GDP) the substitution effect is more difficult to control for. Ideally, we would like to have a proxy for the marginal productivity of capital. In practice, we use different measures of the output cycle (including the output gap and the difference between the current rate of growth and its trend, closer to the concept of expansions and recessions as measured for the US by the NBER). 9 We use the log-linear trend of real GDP to compute the output gap at the source country (OUTGAPS) and an expansion dummy (EXPS) that assumes the value of one when the difference between current and trend real growth (alternatively, the growth rate of the output gap) is positive, and zero otherwise. 10 The variable EXPS is close in nature to NBER and OECD-type of dating of the cycle. We use EXPS instead of "official" business cycle dating because the latter is only available for a limited set of countries. It is reassuring that the correlation between our discrete EXPS variable and the NBER and OECD dating is rather high and that our findings are robust to the use of these alternative business cycle dating, as we show later in the paper.
According to the hypothesis underlying the substitution view of cyclical FDI outflows, FDI and domestic investment should behave asymmetrically, with the former falling whenever a rise in marginal productivity leads to an increase in the latter. In the final part of the paper we explore the link between domestic investment and FDI outflows.
As is standard practice in the gravity model, in Equation (1) we take the logs, rather than the level, of FDI flows as our dependent variable. There are several reasons for doing this. First, the log specification provides a useful normalization that reduces the weight of pairs with very large FDI flows. Second, it allows us to interpret the coefficients of our continuous variables as elasticities.
11 Lastly, it has typically provided the best-fit in gravity equations.
Taking logs of FDI, however, is problematic because a large number of observations are zero. Even after dropping pairs for which reported flows are zero throughout the period, nearly 50 percent of FDI observations are zero and about 6 percent of them are negative. The problem of observations that take a zero value is a typical one in gravity equations, and it has been dealt with in different ways. Some authors simply exclude the observations in which the dependent variable takes a value of zero, for which the log does not exist (for example, Rose, 2000) . A problem with this approach is that zero and negative values may convey important information (for instance, zero observations may be more likely during recessions) and dropping them could bias our results.
A natural alternative to by-pass this problem is to use a semi-log specification, at the cost of losing the constant elasticity estimates. Irwin (1995, 1997 ) use a simple transformation to deal with the zeros preserving the advantages of the double-log model. They replaced the dependent variable log(y) by log(1+ y). In this way, regression coefficients can still be interpreted as elasticities when the values of trade are large, since log(1+ x) ≈ log(x), but share the properties of the semi-log for small values of the dependent variable.
In fact, any transformation of the type x = log (a + x) with x >> 0 would work. However, a = 1 is a natural choice because it yields a fixed point at zero, i.e., log (1+x) = x at x = 0.
12 More important, while the transformation of Eichengreen and Irwin adequately deals with the zeros, it cannot deal with the problem of the negative values (negative values are not a problem for trade data). To be able to retain negative FDI flows, we propose the following transformation in the spirit of Eichengreen and Irwin's:
Note that the coefficients from an OLS regression using this transformation has the same properties of the transformation adopted by Eichengreen and Irwin (1997) and can still be interpreted as elasticities for large values of the dependent variable. In addition, the function is continuous (see Figure 2 ) and its derivative with respect to FDI is symmetric around zero and always bounded between zero and one:
Empirical Findings
Fist glance at the data Following Reinhart and Reinhart (2001), we will center our empirical analysis on the impact on FDI flows on what they label the twin cycles: the business (or output) cycle and the interest rate cycle. Their presumption that both cycles tend to move together is no doubt influenced by their focus on the US economy, where the recent years have witnessed a countercyclical monetary policy.
However, a similar countercyclicality of interest rates is exhibited also in Europe and Japan, the other two big FDI source regions. Indeed, as Figures 3-5 show, comovements in both cycles are more pronounced in the latter than they are in the US. 13 The figures chart the real interest rate against the output gap, once both variables have been conditioned on a time trend. The coefficient for the US is equal to that for Japan (and one third for that of Europe) and less closely correlated than in the other two sources.
Using total U.S.-originated FDI flows, Calvo et al. (2000) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) , show that, on average, FDI flows to developing economies tend to be higher when the US are in expansion, or when the monetary stance is tight. As we use a different source of data (bilateral FDI rather than total FDI flows), it is useful, as a first step, to check whether this basic result is also borne out by our dataset.
To do that, we start by use data from all 19 source countries included in our dataset and compute the average North-South FDI flow by splitting the sample according to whether their real interest rate is above or below the country-specific mean, and to whether the source economy is growing below or above its long run trend (EXPS equal to zero and one, respectively). We then repeat the same exercise for FDI originating in the USA, Europe, and Japan. Table 2 reports the results. As can be seen, the evidence seems to confirm previous results for the US: FDI flows tend to be procyclical with respect to output and countercyclical with respect to the interest rate (Japan is the exception).
14 The same message is rendered by using the GAP measure of the cycle. During high interest rate periods FDI flows are on average significantly higher when output is above the long run trend. The results reverses for low interest rate periods, although the difference between expansions and recessions is not significant. Finally, as before, low interest rates are generally associated with larger FDI flows. Thus, this first take on the data appears to suggest that FDI flows are likely to fall with a recession in industrial countries.
Econometric results
A more careful look at the evidence reveals a different (and country-specific) pattern. In Table 3 we present results using our baseline regression (column 1) with the output gap as the key cycle measure. 15 We find that the coefficient for the gap variable is negative but not significant. In contrast, the countercyclicality with respect to domestic real rates reappears strongly both when the interest rate variable is included alone (column 2) or jointly with the gap measure (column 3).
However, the aggregate results of Tables 3 mask important differences across sources. Table 4 replicates the regressions interacting source-specific variables with three source area dummies corresponding to the main three sources of FDI: the U.S., industrial Europe and Japan. Simple inspection of column (1) indicates that output countercyclicality is at its highest for the U.S. (European countries are also countercyclical but significant barely at 12%), while Japan actually displays a procyclical pattern. Similarly, the influence of interest rate shifts is strongly significant for the U.S. and Europe, and larger for the former. The differences in cyclical response are significant in all cases.
The previous results highlight how the cyclical behavior of FDI flows diverges across source areas. In light of the above, to have a more accurate depiction of this cyclical nature, we aggregate Western European countries into a single source to focus on flows originated in three big source regions of comparable economic size: the USA, Japan, and Western Europe (BIG3).
Aggregating Western Europe together leads to more accurate results. When taking individual countries that are highly diverse in size, small countries such as Iceland receive the same weight as large countries such as Germany. From a policy perspective, these two countries should be counted differently, something that we achieve by treating Western Europe as a single source of FDI. 16 Furthermore, aggregating Western Europe into a unique source is a realistic simplification because European cycles tend to be highly correlated. In fact, the first principal component explains 51 percent of the variance of all 14 European countries in the sample. If we focus on the largest 5 countries, as much as 83 percent of the variance is explained by this component. In turn, using the BIG3 sources allows us to separate the effect of the business cycle on FDI out of the three macro-regions while controlling for the role of the source country's real interest rate cycle. This aggregation reduces our sample to 103 pairs and 1801 observations. 17 Table 5 , which reports the regressions for each of the sources, reveals a much clearer picture, confirming what the previous tests hinted at. For the US and Europe, FDI flows are significantly countercyclical with respect to both the output and the interest rate cycle, whereas for Japan FDI flows are procyclical with respect to output (a result closer in nature to the income effect described in the introductory section).
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Robustness
One potential problem with our results is related to our definition of recession and, in particular, how it captures the changes in marginal productivity that underpins the substitutability hypothesis that is consistent with the previous findings. To test the robustness of our results, we replicate the regressions using two alternative cycle measures: the dummy EXPS, described in section 2, and the official dating of recessions and expansions done by the NBER for the US and the OECD for Europe and Japan.
Since the OECD provides dates the cycles for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK, we compute an aggregate European business cycle by computing a weighted average of the six individual countries' business cycles. 19 In most cases, official dating coincides with the dating obtained using EXPS. There are however, some years (especially for Japan) where the two indicators differ. Table 6 compares the cycles obtained in these two ways. Table 7 shows that, although alternative measures tend to yield a somewhat weaker result (due to a loss of precision) in the correlation between output gap and FDI, the basic message is still the same: FDI is countercyclical for the first two source areas (the sign of the business cycle measure is negative although it fails to be significant two thirds of the time) while results for the interest rate cycle remain the same.
Finally, one could argue that the negative link between source output and FDI might be reflecting a negative correlation between source and host business cycles. Formally, assume that FDI from source s to host h is described by the following relationship:
We approximate the European interest rate with the German interest rate. 18 A rapid computation shows that the effect of cyclical movements are by no means neglegible. Using the statistics reported in Table 1 , we can infer that a one standard deviation increase in the real interest rate is approximately associated with average declines of 41%, 18% and 9% in North-South FDI flows originated in the US, Europe and Japan, respectively. The numbers are obtained multplying the standard deviation times the interest rate coefficient in equations (3), (6) and (9). 19 More precisely, we use the following procedure. For each country-year, we assign a value 1 when a country is in expansion and a value zero when the country is in recession. Then we compute country weights by dividing total average GDP for the 6 countries by individuals country's GDP (the procedure yields the following weights: Belgium 0.035, France 0.221, Germany 0.296, Italy 0.179, Spain 0.085, UK 0.184). Finally, we consider Europe to be in expansion when the aggregate index takes a value bigger than 0.5 and Europe to be in recession when the aggregate index takes a value below 0.5. It should be pointed out that the results are robust to different thresholds because there is only one case in which the index is in the 0.3-0.7 range (we have a 0.416 for 1991). Table 5 and replacing the host GDP by its trend (which is not affect by the cyclical behavior of the source country). Table 8 reports the results. Comparison with Table 5 clearly shows that the results do not change.
Substitutability of investment
The results reported so far appear to support the view that the substitution effect described in the introductory section dominates the income effect derived from unexpected earnings or losses during expansions and recessions. Intuitively, the argument would indicate that, as investment prospects deteriorate in the contractionary phase of the cycle, investors tend to favor relatively more profitable options abroad. Thus, if domestic and foreign investment opportunities compete with each other for the same pool of financial resources, we should expect that they move in opposite directions during the cycle, with the rise of the one being accompanied by the decline of the other.
We look at this in the data by including the log of domestic investment (LINV) at the source areas in the split sample regressions ( Table 9 ). The results confirm that, indeed, in the US and Europe where FDI is clearly countercyclical, investment at home and abroad are negatively correlated. By contrast, in procyclical Japan, domestic investment and FDI move together.
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Does this sustitutability extend to portfolio investent? Some analysts have recently put forward the idea that FDI may substitute for portfolio investment as a source of financing in developing countries. As the argument goes, firms in risky economies with limited access to segmented international capital markets may find themselves forced to finance their operation by selling a controlling stock to developed countries' foreign investors that can finance the acquisition at lower rates at home. Thus, the more imperfect the market (the riskier the host country), the higher the incidence of FDI vis à vis portfolio investment. 22 In other words, the positive trend in FDI to developing economies may not be independent from the recent stream of financial crisis and the decline in capital flows to emerging markets. If so, both sources of financing should move in opposite directions: as portfolio capital pulls out during a crisis, FDI takes the lead. To test whether hostspecific risk is driving the recent evolution of FDI through the mentioned channel, we add the log of portfolio investment originated in the source to our basic specification. As columns 4-6 show, the evidence on this front is at best mixed. While for the European area portfolio investment displays the expected negative sign, the link is positive for both the US and Japan. However, the coefficient is statistically significant only for the case of Japan.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examined how the business and interest rate cycles in developed countries affects their FDI in developing countries. By using different measures of the cycle, we find that the cyclical nature of FDI differs according to the source: while for the US and Europe FDI flows are countercyclical, the opposite is true for Japan.
The results offer two important implications. The first one, related with the nature of FDI flows, is that, contrary to what it is usually claimed, FDI flows to developing countries may benefit from recessions in industrial countries and the monetary easing that typically accompanies them, particularly in those economies such as the Latin American ones where European and American FDI prevails.
The second implication has to do with the very nature of FDI. Our findings highlight the substitutability between investment at home and abroad. However, we do not find evidence of a complementarity with portfolio investment, contradicting the view of FDI as a substitute for portfolio financing in economies with restricted access to international capital. Indeed, in the only case in which portfolio and FDI flows display a significant link, namely in Japan, they are positively correlated. The averages are computed dropping all zero pairs 
